IDBI Bank vs Yes Bank (2026): NIM, ROA, Turnaround, Ownership & Which Is Better?
IDBI Bank versus Yes Bank is not merely a bank comparison. It is a comparison of two different kinds of catalyst.
IDBI Bank already produces 3.61% NIM, 1.89% ROA, 0.16% net NPA and 26.92% capital adequacy.
Its unresolved question is ownership.
The government and LIC's strategic divestment process remains pending, with Fairfax Financial reported as the frontrunner in August 2026.
Yes Bank's ownership catalyst is much further along.
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation already owns approximately 24.9% and is the bank's largest shareholder.
Its unresolved question is profitability.
Yes Bank produces only around 0.9% ROA and a 2.7% NIM, while cost-to-income remains above 60%.
IDBI investors are waiting for an ownership event to catch up with strong bank economics. Yes Bank investors are waiting for bank economics to catch up with an ownership event that has already happened.
The catalyst-certainty matrix
Operating catalyst: already delivered
High ROA, high NIM, strong capital, low net NPA and rapid credit growth are already visible in reported financials.
Ownership catalyst: pending
The strategic sale is advanced, but not completed. Buyer, final terms and regulatory approvals still matter.
Ownership catalyst: already delivered
SMBC already holds approximately 24.9% and is the largest shareholder, adding governance, corporate and cross-border optionality.
Operating catalyst: still developing
NII, PAT and loans are growing strongly, but ROA and cost efficiency remain well below IDBI's current levels.
This distinction prevents a common analytical mistake: treating a pending IDBI sale as guaranteed economics or treating SMBC's completed Yes Bank stake as if strategic ownership automatically creates higher profitability.
IDBI Bank vs Yes Bank: Q1 FY2027 scoreboard
| Metric | IDBI Bank | Yes Bank | Current Reading |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 PAT | ₹2,115 Cr | ₹1,071 Cr | IDBI absolute profit |
| PAT growth | +5% | +33.7% | Yes Bank growth |
| NII | ₹3,486 Cr | ₹2,786 Cr | IDBI |
| NII growth | +10% | +17.5% | Yes Bank |
| Operating profit | ₹2,168 Cr | ₹1,704 Cr | IDBI absolute |
| Operating-profit trend | Pressured by lower non-interest income | +25.5% | Yes Bank momentum |
| Deposits | ₹3,25,757 Cr | ₹3,15,373 Cr | Very similar scale |
| Deposit growth | +10% | +14.3% | Yes Bank |
| Net advances | ₹2,58,968 Cr | ₹2,85,118 Cr | Yes Bank scale |
| Advance growth | +22% | +18.3% | IDBI |
| CASA ratio | 43.64% | 32.7% | IDBI |
| NIM | 3.61% | 2.7% | IDBI |
| ROA | 1.89% | ~0.9% | IDBI |
| ROE | 14.80% | ~8% range | IDBI |
| Cost-to-income / cost-to-net-income | 52.02% | 62.8% | IDBI |
| GNPA | 2.30% | 1.30% | Yes Bank |
| NNPA | 0.16% | 0.20% | IDBI slightly |
| Provision coverage | 99.31% | 81.7% | IDBI |
| Capital adequacy | 26.92% | Comfortably above regulatory minimums | IDBI exceptionally high |
| IDBI Tier 1 / CET I disclosed ratio | 26.38% | Not directly comparable here | IDBI |
| Credit-deposit ratio | 79.50% | ~90.5% | IDBI funding headroom |
| Strategic ownership catalyst | Strategic sale pending | SMBC 24.9% already completed | Different certainty levels |
| 28 Aug P/E | 10.69x | 18.37x | IDBI cheaper earnings |
| 28 Aug P/B | 1.59x | 1.32x | Yes Bank cheaper book |
Start with the business, not the privatisation headline: IDBI is already highly profitable
ROA:
1.89%.
This is the most important IDBI Bank number.
A bank producing close to 1.9% ROA does not need a strategic sale to prove the existing business can earn attractive returns.
The ownership event may change governance, strategy, capital allocation or market perception.
It is not the source of today's operating profitability.
IDBI's NIM is also materially stronger
3.61% versus Yes Bank at 2.7%.
The 91-basis-point gap is enormous in banking.
It means IDBI starts each quarter with substantially more core spread income relative to earning assets.
This advantage exists despite Q1 NIM itself declining from IDBI's prior quarter.
That sequential NIM decline is important
IDBI's NIM was 4.15% in Q4 FY2026 and fell to 3.61% in Q1 FY2027.
So the current 3.61% remains strong relative to Yes Bank, but the direction should not be ignored.
The bank needs to demonstrate that margin stabilises as:
- loan mix changes.
- deposit repricing continues.
- competition for quality borrowers remains intense.
The liability franchise gives IDBI a strong starting point
CASA ratio:
43.64%.
Yes Bank:
32.7%.
IDBI therefore has a much larger share of deposits in lower-cost current and savings accounts.
Its Q1 cost of deposits fell to approximately 4.59%.
Cost of funds fell to around 4.68%.
But IDBI's CASA ratio is moving in the wrong direction
It was approximately 44.63% a year earlier.
It fell to 43.64%.
The absolute CASA balance still grew 7% year on year.
The ratio fell because other deposit categories grew faster.
This is not a liability crisis, but it is worth monitoring because the high CASA ratio is a key part of IDBI's NIM advantage.
IDBI is also growing credit faster
Net advances increased approximately 22% year on year to ₹2,58,968 crore.
Yes Bank grew around 18.3%.
IDBI's loan mix is approximately 70% retail and 30% corporate on a gross-advances basis.
This creates a relatively granular growth profile rather than a bank dominated by large corporate exposures.
The credit-deposit ratio gives IDBI more funding room
IDBI:
79.50%.
Yes Bank:
roughly 90.5%.
Yes Bank is deploying a much larger proportion of deposits into loans.
That can support NII growth.
It also means future high-teens credit growth requires stronger ongoing deposit mobilisation.
Yes Bank's strongest current argument is acceleration
PAT increased 33.7%.
NII increased 17.5%.
Operating profit increased 25.5%.
Loans increased 18.3%.
Deposits increased 14.3%.
The bank is improving across several parts of the income statement simultaneously.
This is a much stronger operating trajectory than the old Yes Bank turnaround story
For years, the Yes Bank thesis centred on survival, recapitalisation and cleaning up historical stress.
Q1 FY2027 looks different.
The discussion is increasingly about:
- loan growth.
- NII growth.
- fees.
- operating leverage.
- ROA progression.
That is the correct evolution for a repaired bank.
Asset quality has become a genuine Yes Bank strength
GNPA:
1.3%.
IDBI:
2.30%.
Yes Bank therefore has the cleaner gross recognised NPA stock.
Gross slippages also declined to approximately ₹964 crore from ₹1,458 crore a year earlier.
Yes Bank management also highlighted the lowest retail slippages in ten quarters
This is important because the bank is accelerating retail lending.
Fast retail growth is only valuable if newer vintages remain clean.
The current slippage trend gives positive early evidence.
IDBI wins after provisioning
Net NPA:
IDBI 0.16%.
Yes Bank 0.20%.
The difference is small.
The provisioning difference is not.
IDBI provision coverage is approximately 99.31%.
Yes Bank is around 81.7%.
IDBI's 99%+ provision coverage creates an unusually protected recognised NPA book
IDBI has maintained provision coverage above 99% for an extended period.
This means virtually all recognised gross stress has already been economically absorbed through provisions or technical write-offs.
It gives shareholders significant protection against old recognised NPAs.
But gross NPA still matters
IDBI's 2.30% GNPA is materially above Yes Bank's 1.3%.
Provisioning can protect earnings from an existing bad loan.
It does not make the operational work of recovery disappear.
Yes Bank therefore deserves credit for carrying the cleaner gross recognised book.
Capital creates the largest gap in the entire comparison
IDBI Bank CRAR:
26.92%.
Tier 1 / CET I disclosed ratio:
26.38%.
Those are exceptionally high numbers for a commercial bank.
IDBI has far more regulatory-capital headroom than it currently needs to support its balance sheet.
Why does so much capital matter?
It gives IDBI strategic flexibility to:
- grow risk-weighted assets.
- absorb ECL or regulatory changes.
- support a new controlling shareholder's strategy.
- avoid near-term dilutive equity raising.
It also creates a profitability trade-off.
Excess equity reduces financial leverage and can suppress ROE.
This explains why IDBI's ROE looks less spectacular than its ROA
ROA:
1.89%.
ROE:
14.80%.
A bank with less capital leverage could produce a much higher ROE from the same ROA.
IDBI's current capital surplus therefore creates future capital-deployment optionality.
Yes Bank has the opposite challenge
Its problem is not excess capital suppressing an otherwise spectacular ROA.
Its ROA itself is still around 0.9%.
That means the next leg of shareholder-return improvement needs stronger operating profitability.
Yes Bank's cost-to-income ratio identifies exactly where the opportunity sits
Q1 cost-to-income:
62.8%.
A year earlier:
67.1%.
The improvement is real.
The absolute level remains high.
IDBI's cost-to-net-income ratio was 52.02%.
A ten-percentage-point efficiency gap is enormous
Yes Bank currently spends much more of its operating revenue running the franchise.
If cost-to-income falls toward the mid-50s while NII grows mid-teens, operating leverage can materially raise ROA.
This is arguably more important than whether loan growth is 18% or 20%.
IDBI has its own cost issue this quarter
IDBI's cost-to-net-income ratio worsened from 48.86% a year earlier to 52.02%.
Non-interest income fell 28% year on year to approximately ₹1,032 crore.
This pressured operating profit despite healthy NII growth.
IDBI is already the more profitable bank, but Q1 was not perfect.
This is why PAT growth alone can be misleading
IDBI PAT growth:
only 5%.
Yes Bank:
33.7%.
Yet IDBI's ROA is more than twice Yes Bank's.
Growth rate measures change.
ROA measures the profitability level being changed from.
A low-return bank can grow profit much faster while still remaining less profitable.
For a commercial stock comparison, both level and direction matter
IDBI: high profitability level, moderate current earnings growth.
Yes Bank: lower profitability level, much faster current improvement.
The better stock outcome depends on whether the market has already priced those trajectories correctly.
Now add the ownership catalysts—but keep their certainty levels separate
Yes Bank's SMBC transaction belongs in the completed column.
SMBC is already the largest shareholder with approximately 24.9% ownership.
Two nominee directors and strategic collaboration are already part of the governance architecture.
IDBI Bank's strategic sale belongs in the pending column.
The Yes Bank strategic catalyst is no longer speculative
SMBC's ownership can potentially strengthen:
- governance.
- risk management.
- Japanese corporate relationships.
- cross-border banking.
- brand confidence.
- funding access over time.
But strategic sponsorship is an input.
It still has to appear in NIM, fees, ROA and ROE before shareholders receive the full economic benefit.
This prevents another common mistake: valuing Yes Bank as though SMBC economics are already fully realised
The ownership is completed.
The operating transformation is not.
Q1 ROA around 0.9% and cost-to-income of 62.8% demonstrate how much work remains.
IDBI's strategic catalyst carries much greater event risk
India's strategic divestment process has been running for years.
Revised bids from Fairfax Financial and Emirates NBD revived the process in 2026.
By August, Reuters reported Fairfax was poised to acquire a majority stake and that the proposal had cleared a senior bureaucratic stage.
But final governmental and regulatory approvals remained outstanding.
As of August 31, 2026, the transaction is not complete.
That distinction should affect valuation discipline
An investor can reasonably assign some probability-weighted value to a potential strategic change.
An investor should not treat:
- Fairfax as the final owner.
- the purchase price as fixed.
- future strategy as known.
- regulatory approval as guaranteed.
until the transaction actually closes.
IDBI's strongest defence against event disappointment is that the underlying bank is already profitable
If the strategic sale takes longer than expected, IDBI still owns:
- 1.89% ROA.
- 3.61% NIM.
- 22% loan growth.
- 43.64% CASA.
- 0.16% NNPA.
- 26.92% capital adequacy.
The thesis does not collapse into an empty event shell.
Yes Bank's strongest defence is that its operating turnaround is already accelerating
If strategic synergies from SMBC arrive slowly, Yes Bank still has:
- 17.5% NII growth.
- 18.3% credit growth.
- 14.3% deposit growth.
- 25.5% operating-profit growth.
- 1.3% GNPA.
This is no longer a business whose entire thesis depends on a new shareholder.
The valuation tells us investors already distinguish profitability level from growth rate
August 28, 2026:
- IDBI Bank price: approximately ₹92.66.
- IDBI P/E: 10.69x.
- IDBI P/B: 1.59x.
- Yes Bank price: approximately ₹22.10.
- Yes Bank P/E: 18.37x.
- Yes Bank P/B: 1.32x.
IDBI is much cheaper on earnings
10.69x versus 18.37x.
That is roughly a 42% lower P/E multiple.
And IDBI currently produces the much higher ROA.
On a simple earnings-plus-current-profitability comparison, IDBI is difficult to dismiss.
Why is IDBI more expensive on book value?
Because each rupee of IDBI's book currently earns far more.
IDBI P/B:
1.59x.
Yes Bank:
1.32x.
The approximately 20% book-value premium is much smaller than the ROA gap.
This is why P/B and P/E produce different conclusions.
Yes Bank's 18x-plus P/E is a bet on future operating leverage
The current earnings base is still relatively small compared with the equity franchise and deposit base.
Investors paying the higher earnings multiple need:
- ROA to keep rising.
- cost-to-income to keep falling.
- NIM to improve.
- SMBC-linked opportunities to produce revenue.
- credit growth to remain clean.
If Yes Bank reaches 1.2%-1.3% ROA, the earnings equation changes materially
That does not require doubling the balance sheet.
It requires better profit conversion from the existing one.
The most powerful route is likely:
higher NII
plus
lower operating-cost intensity
plus
controlled credit costs.
IDBI's valuation has a different risk
The bank already earns high ROA.
The market may therefore have capitalised both:
- strong current economics.
- some probability of a successful strategic sale.
If the sale is delayed, terms disappoint, or post-sale strategic benefits prove modest, event premium can disappear even while the bank remains profitable.
The scenario tree makes the trade-off clearer
IDBI: sale closes + economics hold
The strongest outcome. New strategic ownership is layered onto a bank already producing high ROA, strong NIM and huge capital buffers.
IDBI: sale delayed + economics hold
The event trade weakens, but the operating thesis remains intact. Valuation depends increasingly on standalone profitability rather than takeover optionality.
IDBI: sale closes + economics weaken
A strategic buyer cannot rescue valuation if NIM, ROA or credit quality deteriorate materially. Bank fundamentals still dominate over time.
Yes Bank has its own three scenarios
SMBC synergy + ROA convergence
Cost efficiency improves, cross-border/corporate opportunities grow, ROA rises above 1% and the higher P/E becomes easier to defend.
Growth without profitability conversion
Loans and deposits keep growing but cost-to-income remains above 60%. The balance sheet gets larger without enough improvement in shareholder returns.
Fast growth creates credit cost
Recent loan vintages eventually raise slippage, slowing the profitability turnaround and challenging the strategic-growth narrative.
Bull Run's market snapshot shows the stocks are already trading on very different expectations
| Bull Run Snapshot — 25 Aug 2026 | IDBI Bank | Yes Bank |
|---|---|---|
| Price | ₹88.31 | ₹22.50 |
| Market capitalisation | ₹92,761 Cr | ₹74,041 Cr |
| 1-month return | +3.98% | -1.96% |
| 3-month return | +20.17% | -1.14% |
| 6-month return | -22.34% | +6.94% |
| 1-year return | -6.56% | +15.09% |
| 52-week high | ₹118.38 | ₹25.78 |
| 52-week low | ₹61.01 | ₹17.20 |
| RSI 14 | 65.48 | 41.24 |
| Dividend yield | 2.44% | 0.00% |
| Bull Run Score | 50.6/100 | 39.7/100 |
IDBI's three-month momentum reflects renewed event attention
Bull Run's August 25 snapshot showed approximately 20% three-month return.
That period overlaps with renewed progress in the strategic-sale process.
Investors should therefore separate:
price movement caused by improving bank fundamentals
from
price movement caused by transaction expectations.
Yes Bank's stronger one-year return reflects a different rerating
Yes Bank had gained approximately 15% over one year despite weaker short-term momentum.
The market has increasingly recognised:
- SMBC sponsorship.
- better loan growth.
- lower GNPA.
- improving operating profit.
But the Bull Run Score remains lower because current profitability and valuation remain less compelling.
There is also a useful funding-market datapoint from August
Yes Bank had considered a roughly $500 million dollar bond issue but withdrew the plan along with Federal Bank and RBL Bank when market pricing became unattractive.
This should not be interpreted as a solvency issue.
The banks chose not to accept uneconomic funding costs.
It does illustrate that external wholesale funding remains price-sensitive even for improving franchises.
For Yes Bank, granular deposits therefore matter even more
With a credit-deposit ratio around 90%, continued high-teens loan growth needs:
- strong retail deposits.
- CASA improvement.
- disciplined wholesale funding.
The 14.3% deposit growth in Q1 is healthy.
Keeping deposits closer to loan growth is important for maintaining NIM.
IDBI has more balance-sheet funding headroom
Its 79.5% credit-deposit ratio gives it more room before liability growth becomes restrictive.
That is especially valuable if a new strategic shareholder eventually wants to accelerate credit growth.
The bank would begin that phase with unusually strong capital and reasonable funding capacity.
The single most important IDBI metric from here is NIM durability
IDBI already has the capital.
It already has the low NNPA.
It already has high ROA.
What needs monitoring is whether 3.61% NIM stabilises after the sharp sequential decline from 4.15%.
If margin keeps compressing, today's ROA advantage can narrow.
The single most important Yes Bank metric is cost-to-income
Yes Bank does not need another shareholder transaction.
It needs the 62.8% ratio to keep falling.
If it moves through the high-50s while NII continues growing mid-teens, operating profit can compound substantially faster than assets.
That is the bridge from turnaround bank to high-return bank.
The thesis breakers
IDBI Bank
- NIM continues falling materially from 3.61%.
- ROA drops from the current high level.
- 22% loan growth produces future credit stress.
- The strategic sale is delayed again or final terms disappoint expectations.
- A buyer changes strategy in a way that consumes IDBI's capital without adequate returns.
Yes Bank
- Cost-to-income remains above 60%.
- ROA fails to move sustainably above 1%.
- High-teens credit growth creates fresh slippage.
- Deposit growth falls behind lending growth and pressures funding costs.
- Investors overestimate the speed or size of SMBC-related operating synergies.
IDBI Bank vs Yes Bank: current conclusion
IDBI Bank is currently the stronger bank.
Yes Bank currently has the faster operating turnaround.
IDBI Bank vs Yes Bank FAQs
Which bank is more profitable today?
IDBI Bank, with approximately 1.89% ROA versus Yes Bank around 0.9%.
Which has higher NIM?
IDBI Bank at approximately 3.61% versus Yes Bank at 2.7%.
Which has higher CASA?
IDBI Bank at approximately 43.64% versus Yes Bank at 32.7%.
Which is growing loans faster?
IDBI Bank at approximately 22% versus Yes Bank at 18.3%.
Which has lower GNPA?
Yes Bank at approximately 1.3% versus IDBI Bank at 2.30%.
Which has lower NNPA?
IDBI Bank slightly, at approximately 0.16% versus Yes Bank at 0.2%.
Which has stronger provision coverage?
IDBI Bank by a wide margin, at approximately 99.31%.
Has IDBI Bank been sold to Fairfax?
No. As of August 31, 2026, Fairfax has been reported as the frontrunner, but the strategic sale has not completed and remains subject to final approvals and transaction execution.
Does SMBC control Yes Bank?
SMBC is Yes Bank's largest shareholder with approximately 24.9%. That strategic stake is completed, but investors should not assume this guarantees any specific future profitability outcome.
Which stock is cheaper?
IDBI Bank is much cheaper on late-August P/E, while Yes Bank is cheaper on P/B.
Where can investors compare them on Bull Run?
Use the IDBI Bank stock page, Yes Bank stock page and Bull Run's Private Sector Bank sector research.
Research sources
- Bull Run — IDBI Bank
- Bull Run — Yes Bank
- Bull Run — Private Sector Bank sector research
- IDBI Bank official FY2027 disclosures
- IDBI Bank official Q1 FY2027 press release
- YES Bank official corporate announcements
- YES Bank official investor presentations
- DIPAM — Government of India disinvestment information
- IDBI Bank late-August valuation data
- Yes Bank late-August valuation data
Disclaimer
This article is educational and informational only. The proposed strategic divestment of IDBI Bank had not completed as of August 31, 2026. Reports identifying Fairfax Financial as a frontrunner describe an evolving transaction that remains subject to final governmental, regulatory and transaction approvals; no future owner, closing date or strategic outcome should be treated as guaranteed. SMBC's approximately 24.9% ownership of Yes Bank is already completed, but strategic sponsorship does not guarantee future earnings, valuation or operating synergies. IDBI Bank's Q1 FY2027 NIM fell sequentially despite remaining substantially above Yes Bank's, while Yes Bank's current profitability remains below IDBI's despite faster growth. Credit losses from rapidly originated loans can emerge with a lag. Bull Run market and technical data is dated August 25, 2026; external valuation multiples are dated August 28. Nothing here recommends buying, selling or holding IDBI Bank, Yes Bank or any security. Bull Run is not a SEBI-registered Research Analyst or Investment Adviser.