Trent vs Avenue Supermarts DMart (2026): Stores, Margins, Growth & Which Is Better?

Trent vs DMart (2026): Which Retail Stock Is Better?

Two routes to the Indian consumer wallet · Q1 FY2027

Trent and DMart are both called retailers, but almost everything about how they earn money is different.

DMart wins by being boring on purpose. It sells groceries and daily-use products cheaply, turns inventory quickly, controls operating costs and uses scale to negotiate with suppliers.

Trent wins by making fashion feel new. Westside and Zudio depend on product design, private labels, rapid assortment changes, store rollout and persuading shoppers to return before they actually need another shirt.

That difference creates radically different margins, store economics and growth ceilings, even though both companies currently trade at roughly the same trailing P/E.

Trent Q1 FY27 standalone revenue₹5,666 Cr+18.5% YoY
DMart Q1 FY27 consolidated revenue₹18,795 Cr+14.9% YoY

The most surprising number in this comparison is 84

Trent trades at approximately 84.5 times earnings. DMart trades at approximately 83.8 times.

That is an unusually narrow valuation gap for businesses with very different growth and profitability profiles.

Trent has five-year sales growth above 50%, ROE around 27.6%, ROCE around 30.2% and net margin around 8.6%.

DMart has five-year sales growth around 23.3%, ROE near 12.9%, ROCE around 17.7% and net margin around 4.3%.

On those figures alone, Trent appears much stronger.

But DMart's premium has historically reflected resilience, grocery demand, store-level productivity, disciplined capital allocation and a model that has survived several retail cycles.

The real debate is whether Trent's faster fashion economics are durable enough to deserve the same long-duration confidence.

Trent vs DMart financial comparison

Metric Trent Avenue Supermarts / DMart Current Edge
Market capitalisation₹152,944 Cr₹256,284 CrDMart
P/E84.55x83.80xAlmost identical
P/B21.90x10.48xDMart
ROE27.63%12.95%Trent
ROCE30.15%17.65%Trent
Net profit margin8.64%4.29%Trent
Debt-to-equity0.070.10Both low
Interest coverage14.26x29.73xDMart
Current ratio1.26x1.98xDMart
Operating cash flow / PAT1.55x1.17xTrent
5-year sales growth50.58%23.31%Trent
5-year profit growthCurrent generic field unavailable21.99%DMart has clean comparable series
5-year FCF₹1,788 Cr-₹2,212 CrNeeds capex context
Dividend yield0.14%0%Neither is an income story
Promoter holding37.01%74.65%Different structures
Promoter pledge0%0%Both
FII holding15.14%9.23%Trent
DII holding23.27%8.74%Trent
Bull Run Score67.5/10059.2/100Trent

Trent's business model starts with private labels, not rented shelves

Westside and Zudio largely control what appears inside their stores.

That is fundamentally different from a supermarket filled with products manufactured by hundreds of third-party FMCG companies.

Private labels give Trent greater control over design, pricing, sourcing, product freshness and gross margin.

They also create fashion risk.

If the merchandise misses customer preferences, Trent owns the inventory problem.

That means product teams and supply-chain speed are central to the moat.

DMart's business model begins with a completely different promise

DMart is built around everyday low cost and everyday low price.

The customer does not visit because this week's rice bag is fashionable.

The customer visits because household staples, packaged foods and everyday products are consistently offered at compelling prices.

That drives high traffic but produces much thinner margins.

The model succeeds only if purchasing, rent, logistics, inventory turns and employee productivity are tightly controlled.

DMart's 4%-plus net margin therefore represents a very different kind of retail achievement than Trent's 8%-plus margin.

Trent crossed 1,300 fashion stores, but Q1 expansion slowed dramatically

At June 30, 2026, Trent operated 1,312 stores across its fashion concepts.

The portfolio included 301 Westside stores.

Zudio had 982 stores, including seven in the UAE.

Another 29 stores operated across other lifestyle concepts.

Total retail footprint exceeded 18 million square feet across roughly 330 cities.

But Q1 net additions were only one Westside and nineteen Zudio stores.

That is far slower than the pace seen during parts of FY2026.

The slowdown in store additions is not necessarily bad

Opening stores is easy to celebrate. Making every store earn an attractive return is harder.

Trent's like-for-like fashion growth in Q1 FY2027 was only in the low single digits.

That means much of total revenue growth came from stores opened during recent periods rather than dramatic acceleration at mature stores.

A more measured rollout can therefore be rational if management is protecting store quality, real-estate economics and cannibalisation.

The market reaction to Trent's July revenue update showed why investors care: a high-valuation retailer needs both new-store growth and healthy mature-store productivity.

DMart has the opposite productivity problem

DMart opened only three stores during Q1 FY2027, ending the quarter with 503 stores.

The bigger concern was not simply the low addition count.

Two-year-and-older stores grew only about 5.5% year on year, down from 7.1% in Q1 FY2026.

Growth at mature stores in large metros was approximately flat.

Non-metro stores performed better.

Because large mature metro stores generate much higher revenue per square foot, weak growth there has an outsized effect on overall productivity.

Why same-store growth matters more than total revenue growth

A retailer can make total revenue rise simply by opening stores.

That does not tell investors whether existing stores are becoming more productive.

Like-for-like or same-store growth strips out much of the contribution from new locations.

For Trent, low-single-digit fashion LFL suggests rapid historic expansion is doing a large part of the current growth work.

For DMart, 5.5% growth at two-year-plus stores shows continued positive growth but a meaningful slowdown.

Both retailers therefore enter FY2027 with a store-productivity question, just for different reasons.

Trent's Q1 profit grew much faster than revenue

Standalone Q1 FY2027 revenue increased 18.5% to ₹5,666 crore while PAT increased about 26% to ₹532 crore.

Operating EBITDA increased approximately 36% to ₹847 crore.

Operating EBIT increased roughly 33% to ₹732 crore.

The operating EBIT margin improved to about 12.9% from approximately 11.5% a year earlier.

That is operating leverage.

Despite slower reported revenue growth than investors had become accustomed to, the company extracted substantially more operating profit from each rupee of sales.

Trent's emerging categories are quietly becoming material

Beauty and personal care, innerwear and footwear together contributed more than 21% of Q1 revenue.

This matters because Westside and Zudio are often discussed as clothing chains.

Expanding adjacent categories increases the amount Trent can sell to each visitor without adding another store.

Westside's online business also continued growing, with online sales representing more than 6% of Westside revenue.

That creates a second route to monetise the same customer relationship.

Zudio remains the most important variable in Trent's valuation

Zudio changed Trent from a department-store company into one of India's largest value-fashion platforms.

The concept uses sharp pricing, fast merchandise turnover and frequent assortment changes to attract younger and value-conscious consumers.

Its expansion into hundreds of Indian cities created Trent's extraordinary multi-year revenue growth.

The problem with extraordinary growth is mathematical.

Once Zudio operates close to 1,000 locations, maintaining 40%-plus network expansion becomes harder.

Future growth increasingly needs to come from store productivity, new cities, new categories and potentially international markets.

Westside matters because its economics are different

Westside serves a more premium customer and operates a broader lifestyle assortment than Zudio.

It has a significantly smaller store network but higher average selling prices and deeper private-label positioning.

Trent added only one net Westside location in Q1.

If Westside expansion accelerates while maintaining returns, it can become a second meaningful store-growth leg rather than leaving Zudio responsible for most incremental square footage.

DMart's Q1 looked steady at first glance

Consolidated Q1 FY2027 revenue increased about 14.9% to ₹18,794.5 crore.

Consolidated PAT rose approximately 11.3% to ₹860.6 crore.

EBITDA increased roughly 15.4% to ₹1,499 crore.

EBITDA margin improved marginally to about 8.0% from 7.9%.

These are not weak results.

The concern is that revenue growth has decelerated relative to the valuation the market historically assigned to DMart.

DMart's metro slowdown deserves more attention than one-quarter profit

Management explicitly said growth at older stores in large metros was flat.

Those stores carry higher revenue per square foot than newer and non-metro stores.

Several possible explanations matter:

  • Quick commerce has changed convenience expectations.
  • Large metro households have more online alternatives.
  • Competitive supermarket density has increased.
  • Some mature stores may be approaching physical capacity.
  • Urban consumption can remain uneven by income cohort.

The correct interpretation may involve several of these factors simultaneously.

Quick commerce attacks DMart differently from how e-commerce attacks Trent

A grocery customer can switch a weekly purchase to a 10-minute delivery app with almost no emotional cost.

That creates a direct convenience challenge for physical grocery retail.

Fashion behaves differently.

Consumers still value browsing, trying products, seeing new collections and making discretionary purchases in stores.

Online fashion matters, but it does not replace store discovery in exactly the same way quick commerce can replace a top-up grocery trip.

That structural difference makes digital competition more immediate for DMart's urban grocery use case.

DMart Ready is being made more focused, not simply bigger

Avenue Supermarts discontinued DMart Ready operations in seven cities during Q1 FY2027 and concentrated the business in eleven cities.

The strategy suggests management is prioritising unit economics over vanity geographic expansion.

The parent has continued investing in Avenue E-Commerce.

The difficult balance is clear.

DMart cannot ignore digital grocery behaviour, but building a delivery business with supermarket-like margins is challenging.

Trent's margin advantage is enormous

Bull Run's current net profit margin for Trent is approximately 8.64%, twice DMart's roughly 4.29%.

Trent's ROE is approximately 27.6% compared with DMart at 12.9%.

ROCE is around 30.2% for Trent versus 17.7% for DMart.

This is the economic reward for private-label fashion when the merchandise works.

The risk is markdowns and inventory obsolescence when it does not.

DMart earns less margin but sells necessities with repeat demand

Food and grocery categories dominate DMart's sales mix.

That makes the model less dependent on fashion taste, discretionary events or seasonal collection success.

Customers need food, toiletries and household products regardless of whether apparel trends are exciting.

This gives DMart a resilience advantage during weak discretionary-consumption periods.

It also puts a structural ceiling on margins because customers are highly price-sensitive and branded suppliers know their own product economics.

Inventory risk is completely different

An unsold fashion collection becomes less valuable with time. An unsold packet of detergent usually does not become unfashionable.

Trent therefore needs rapid product cycles and disciplined markdown management.

DMart needs efficient replenishment, shrinkage control and inventory turns.

Fashion can generate much higher gross margin, but mistakes can be expensive.

Grocery generates lower gross margin, but product demand is easier to forecast.

Why DMart's negative five-year FCF does not automatically signal poor economics

DMart has been investing aggressively in owned stores, distribution infrastructure and expansion.

Bull Run's five-year free-cash-flow field is approximately negative ₹2,212 crore.

That needs capex context.

A retailer buying land and constructing long-lived stores can produce lower current FCF while increasing future earning capacity.

The key question is whether those stores eventually produce high enough cash-on-cash returns.

Trent currently converts accounting profit into cash strongly

Operating cash flow is approximately 1.55 times net profit in Bull Run's current series.

DMart is also healthy at around 1.17 times.

Trent's five-year free cash flow is positive at approximately ₹1,788 crore despite rapid store expansion.

That strengthens the argument that recent earnings growth has not been purely accounting-driven.

DMart has the stronger conventional balance-sheet liquidity

Both companies carry low leverage.

Trent's debt-to-equity ratio is approximately 0.07.

DMart's is around 0.10.

DMart has interest coverage near 29.7x compared with Trent around 14.3x.

Its current ratio is approximately 1.98x versus Trent at about 1.26x.

Neither balance sheet currently appears stressed.

The valuation challenge: DMart no longer has faster growth to justify an 84x P/E

DMart's current trailing P/E is approximately 83.8x despite five-year sales growth of about 23.3% and current Q1 revenue growth around 15%.

Those are good numbers for a mature retailer.

They are demanding numbers for an 84x earnings multiple.

The valuation can work if store additions accelerate, mature-store growth recovers and DMart Ready becomes more economically efficient.

If mature metro-store productivity remains weak, multiple compression becomes a meaningful risk even while the company continues growing absolute profit.

Trent has the same valuation problem from the opposite direction

Trent's five-year growth has been extraordinary, but Q1 revenue growth slowed to approximately 19%.

The stock is still priced at roughly 84.5x trailing earnings.

That means investors are not paying for today's 19% growth alone.

They are paying for the belief that Zudio, Westside and adjacent categories can compound at a high rate for many more years.

Low-single-digit like-for-like growth makes that assumption more demanding.

The five-year numbers show why Trent's expectations became so high

Trent's five-year sales growth is approximately 50.6%.

DMart's is approximately 23.3%.

DMart's five-year profit growth is roughly 22%.

Trent's historical generic profit-growth field is not clean enough in the current database to use as a like-for-like comparison, but the revenue acceleration and improvement in returns are visible in official financial statements.

A company cannot compound at 50% indefinitely.

The important question is what Trent's normalised long-term growth rate becomes after the Zudio rollout matures.

One year of stock performance shows how dramatically expectations changed

Market MetricTrentDMart
Price on 25 Aug 2026₹2,930₹3,909.60
1-month return+1.22%-2.72%
3-month return-31.04%-5.21%
6-month return-24.01%+1.14%
1-year return-45.97%-17.26%
52-week high₹5,674₹4,949.50
52-week low₹2,676.05₹3,600
RSI (14)49.9254.67

Trent has lost almost half its value over one year in Bull Run's current snapshot.

Yet its P/E is still above 80.

That illustrates just how extreme the earlier valuation had become.

DMart's correction is smaller but also meaningful.

Falling share prices improve starting valuation, but they do not by themselves make a high-multiple stock inexpensive.

The two businesses are optimised for different consumer behaviour

Trent needs desire

  • Newness.
  • Fashion relevance.
  • Private-label execution.
  • Frequent store visits.
  • Fast inventory refresh.
  • Rapid new-city expansion.

DMart needs habit

  • Low prices.
  • Reliable availability.
  • Efficient inventory turns.
  • Dense store catchments.
  • Supplier purchasing power.
  • Repeat household trips.

Both need productivity

  • High sales per square foot.
  • Disciplined rent and capex.
  • Inventory control.
  • Store-level returns.
  • Strong supply chains.
  • Careful expansion pacing.

Trent's strongest case

The company has proved that an Indian retailer can combine extremely rapid expansion with high return ratios and strong margins.

Zudio created a scalable value-fashion concept.

Westside remains a differentiated private-label department-store brand.

Emerging categories increase wallet share.

International expansion is still early.

If store productivity stabilises and the network continues growing at attractive returns, today's lower share price could eventually be supported by earnings growth rather than multiple expansion.

DMart's strongest case

The company has spent decades proving that disciplined grocery retail can create enormous shareholder value in a sector where margins are naturally thin.

Its brand means value rather than aspiration.

That positioning remains relevant across economic cycles.

A 503-store network is still small relative to India's total grocery market.

The runway therefore exists.

The current question is execution speed and metro productivity, not whether organised food retail has room to grow.

Trent vs DMart: who currently wins each category?

Revenue scale: DMart.

Current Q1 growth: Trent.

Five-year sales growth: Trent.

ROE: Trent.

ROCE: Trent.

Net profit margin: Trent.

Operating cash conversion: Trent.

Balance-sheet liquidity: DMart.

Store count: Trent.

Essential-consumption resilience: DMart.

Fashion and private-label economics: Trent.

Mature-store concern: Both, for different reasons.

P/E valuation: Almost identical.

P/B valuation: DMart.

Bull Run Score: Trent.

Final view: Trent currently has the stronger financial growth and return profile, yet its Q1 slowdown in store additions and low-single-digit like-for-like growth show why investors cannot extrapolate the old Zudio growth rate forever. DMart is the more defensive retail model, but mature metro-store growth has weakened and its P/E remains close to Trent's despite materially lower ROE and growth. At today's numbers, the central question is not which retailer is better known. It is whether Trent can sustain high-return fashion expansion and whether DMart can restore store productivity quickly enough to support an 80-plus earnings multiple.

Trent vs DMart FAQs

Which company has more stores?

Trent, with 1,312 fashion stores at June 30, 2026 versus 503 DMart stores.

Which company has higher revenue?

DMart. Q1 FY2027 consolidated revenue was approximately ₹18,795 crore compared with Trent consolidated revenue of roughly ₹5,755 crore.

Which is growing faster?

Trent currently has the faster five-year growth record and slightly faster Q1 FY2027 revenue growth.

Which has higher ROE?

Trent, at approximately 27.6% compared with DMart around 12.9%.

Which has higher ROCE?

Trent, at approximately 30.2% versus DMart around 17.7%.

Which stock is cheaper on P/E?

They are almost identical in Bull Run's current snapshot, with both trading close to 84 times trailing earnings.

Why is DMart same-store growth slowing?

The company reported flat growth at older stores in large metros while non-metro stores performed better. Competition, convenience alternatives and mature-store capacity can all influence this metric.

Why has Trent's stock fallen despite profit growth?

Revenue growth slowed relative to the exceptionally high expectations embedded in its earlier valuation, while like-for-like growth remained only in the low single digits.

Research sources

Disclaimer

This article is educational and informational only. Retail-company performance can be affected by store additions, same-store sales, inventory turns, gross margins, rents, consumer demand, online competition, markdowns and capital expenditure. Fashion and grocery retailers also have fundamentally different margin structures. Financial metrics and market prices change over time. Nothing here recommends buying, selling or holding Trent, Avenue Supermarts or any other security. Bull Run is not a SEBI-registered Research Analyst or Investment Adviser.